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Abstract
The paper looks at the existence, nature and form of intrahousehold and in-
terhousehold externalities of education on e¢ ciency and production uncertainty of
maize in rural Malawi. Data from the Third Integrated Household Survey are used.
I nd statistically and economically signicant positive intrahousehold and inter-
household externalities of education on both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty,
and that the intrahousehold externality e¤ects are larger than interhousehold exter-
nality e¤ects. Community level schooling is found to substitute for household level
schooling in the sense that farmers who reside in households where members are
not educated have relatively higher e¢ ciency and lower production uncertainty on
account of living in communities where some inhabitants are educated. The paper
also nds that the intrahousehold and interhousehold externality e¤ects are more
pronounced for the least e¢ cient farmers, and that they are monotonic, and largest
when schooling is relatively low.
Keywords: intrahousehold; interhousehold;externality; Malawi
1 Introduction
The level of schooling within and between households may act like a public good in that
the literate household or community members may confer a positive externality on the
illiterate members in the household or community (Basu & Foster, 1998; Basu et al., 2002).
The presence of these positive within and between household education externalities imply
that an individuals education has far larger benets which go beyond the individual. The
extent of schooling within a household and a community can have a positive externality
e¤ect on agricultural productivity and technical e¢ ciency. Such education externalities
might arise for instance as uneducated farmers learn from the superior production choices
of educated farmers in the community. The education externality could also arise when
educated farmers are early innovators and are copied by those with less schooling (Knight
et al., 2003; Weir & Knight, 2004). External benets of education may also accrue within
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households and communities by one person taking decisions on behalf of another person
(Dreze & Saran, 1995).
A number of household level studies have found evidence of education externalities
on agricultural productivity and technical e¢ ciency. There are two strands of literature
on the presence of education externalities in agriculture; one strand examines the role of
education externalities on productivity only, while another strand looks at the role of ed-
ucation externalities on both productivity and technical e¢ ciency. Appleton & Balihuta
(1996) study the relationship between the mean level of education of other farmers in the
same enumeration area on agricultural production in Uganda. They nd a statistically
signicant and substantial externality e¤ect of education. Weir & Knight (2007) inves-
tigate the externality e¤ect of site level education on productivity and e¢ ciency using
Ethiopian data. They nd a statistically signicant externality e¤ect of education on
productivity, but they fail to nd a signicant e¤ect on technical e¢ ciency. Asadullah &
Rahman (2009) examine the role of within household and neighbourhood education on
rice productivity and technical e¢ ciency in Bangladesh. They fail to nd any evidence
of an external benet of schooling, however they nd that household education raises rice
productivity, and reduces technical ine¢ ciencies. Gille (2012) investigates the presence
of inter-household education externalities on agricultural productivity in rural India, and
nds that education spillovers do exist; specically, holding other things constant, one
additional year in the mean level of education of neighbors increases households farm
production by 2%.
This paper uses Malawian data on smallholder maize production in rural areas to
make four contributions to the literature on technical e¢ ciency in agriculture and within
and between household education externalities. First, the existing literature has focused
on the relationship between education externalities and technical e¢ ciency but has pro-
vided no evidence of the relationship between education externalities and agricultural
production uncertainty or risk. Crop production faces inherent uncertainty caused by
variations in weather, disease, insects, and other biological pests. It is quite plausible
to expect that farming households where some members have high levels of schooling or
reside in communities with high levels of schooling would be better able to cope with
production uncertainty and risk through for example learning or copying good crop hus-
bandry from the educated. Here, I assess how education within and between households
a¤ects production uncertainty and the relative magnitudes of the two externalities. Sec-
ond, the existing studies on e¢ ciency have focused on the directions of the externality
e¤ect on technical ine¢ ciency while overlooking the magnitudes of the partial e¤ects. As
noted by Liu & Myers (2009), this makes it impossible to quantify the magnitude of the
intrahousehold and interhousehold externality e¤ects, and to compare the sizes of the
two e¤ects. Knowledge of which e¤ect is larger can be useful for policy in the sense that
it makes it possible to determine which type of policy intervention will have the largest
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impact on ine¢ ciency and uncertainty.
The third contribution relates to an understanding of who benets more from ed-
ucation externalities. The existing literature assumes that the education externality at
the village or community level is the same for all households regardless of the extent of
schooling within a household. One would expect the inter-household education exter-
nality to be relatively more pronounced for those households with little or no schooling
than for those with high levels of schooling. Pooling all households together provides a
misleading picture of the size of the external benets provided by education on technical
e¢ ciency and production uncertainty. Related to this, previous studies have not examined
how the education externality e¤ect varies with di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency. The implicit
assumption made in the literature is that the intrahousehold and interhousehold exter-
nality is the same for the most e¢ cient farmers and the least e¢ cient ones. And again
by lumping all farmers together, the existing literature does not help in understanding
who benets more from education spillovers. A nal contribution of this paper is that it
assesses whether or not the externality e¤ect of education on both technical e¢ ciency and
production uncertainty is positive or negative for all levels of schooling. Previous studies
implicitly assume that the intrahousehold and interhousehold externality is constant over
all levels of education. This is obviously quite restricted as it ignores the possibility that
the externality e¤ect can be non-monotonic: the returns to education can be increasing
at low levels of education followed by diminishing returns at high levels of education. A
failure to capture non-monotonicity can render estimation results imprecise at best and
misleading at worst (Wang, 2002). By allowing a more exible externality e¤ect, the
results can be more informative for the purpose of policy analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a maize
production and education prole for Malawi. In Section 3 the methodology is presented,
and the variables and data used are discussed. This is followed by the empirical results
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Maize Production and Education in Malawi
Malawis economy is agrobased, with the agricultural sector accounting for about 30%
of GDP over the period 2005-2011. Over the same period, the agriculture sector was
by far Malawis most important contributor to economic growth, with a contribution of
34.2 percent to overall GDP growth (NSO, 2012a). Maize is a staple food in Malawi,
and accounts for more than two-thirds of caloric availability (Ecker & Qaim, 2011). As a
result of low food diversication, national food security continues to be dened in terms of
access to maize. Smallholder agriculture is dominated by maize production, for instance,
NSO (2012b) found that 85% of households in Malawi cultivated maize (69% in urban
areas, and 88% in rural areas). Further to that, rain-fed smallholder maize production
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accounts for around one quarter of agricultural GDP. Hence, the relatively large size of
the maize sector means that increases in maize production lead to signicant and strong
increases in overall agricultural GDP growth.
Increased agricultural productivity is one of the key focus areas of the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy (MGDS), an overarching medium term national development
framework. This priority has seen the formulation of a number of sectoral strategy doc-
uments which include: a National Agricultural Policy (NAP) for the period 2010-2016,
and an Agricultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp). The most signicant productivity
enhancing policy intervention in recent years has been the Farm Input Subsidy Program
(FISP), which provides low-cost fertilizer and improved maize seeds to poor smallholders.
Implementation of the FISP started in the 2005/6 cropping season, and in the 2012/13
nancial year, the programme represented 4.6% of GDP or 11.5% of the total national
budget (World Bank, 2013).
To get a sense of howmaize productivity has evolved before and after this major policy
intervention, Figure 1 shows maize production in millions of tonnes, area cultivated in
hectares, and maize yield per hectare for the cropping period 1999/2000-2011/12. The
land area dedicated to the growing of maize has remained fairly unchanged, however, it is
evident that the maize yield per hectare rose sharply following the subsidy. For instance,
the season preceding the subsidy (2004/05), the yield per hectare was 0.8 metric tonnes
per hectare, and for the cropping season 2006/07, the yield per hectare was 2.7 metric
tonnes per hectare. It should be pointed out that the bumper harvests following FISP
coincided with good rains. There is therefore an obvious attribution problem here which
has not yet been resolved, however, it is reasonable to assume that the FISP played a part
in boosting maize yields. Although, the maize productivity has risen to an average yield
per hectare of 2.1 between 2006 and 2012, it is still signicantly lower when compared
with other countries. For instance, the average maize yield over the same period was 4.1
metric tonnes per hectare, and 9.3 metric tonnes per hectare for South Africa and the
United States of America respectively.
Despite recognizing the problem of low maize productivity, the MGDS does not explic-
itly identify education and its potential spillovers as one of the factors that could improve
maize productivity in Malawi. The relevant strategies to increase maize productivity in
the MGDS include: strengthening linkages of farmers to input and output market; pro-
moting appropriate technology development, transfer and absorption; improving access
to inputs; and promoting contract farming arrangements (GOM, 2011). By examining
the nature of intrahousehold and interhousehold education spillovers in maize production,
this paper provides useful insights into the relationship between maize productivity and
education. The formal education system in Malawi is composed of three levels namely;
primary, secondary, and post secondary. Education at all three levels is not compulsory.
The Malawi government cognizant of the crucial role that human capital accumulation
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and development plays in fostering economic growth among other benets introduced free
primary education (FPE) in 1994. With FPE parents no longer have to pay fees for the
primary education of children who attend government schools. Private primary schools
however continue to charge fees. Increasing access to primary and secondary education is
one of the main priority areas identied in the MGDS.
To assess if there have been improvements in education indicators in Malawi between
2004 and 2011, Table 1 reports the levels and trends in: a) adult literacy rates, b) primary
enrolment rates, and c) primary school dropout rates. The proportion of the population
aged 15 years and over that is literate increased marginally from 64% in 2004 to 65%
in 2011; suggesting that there has been very little progress in improving adult literacy
in Malawi. The proportion of adults who can read and write is higher in urban areas
than in rural areas. Besides, the literacy rate for rural areas has remained almost un-
changed while it has increased by about 3 percentage points between 2004 and 2011. For
both years, signicant progress has been made in increasing primary net enrolment rates.
However, primary enrolment levels in rural areas are lower than those for urban areas.
The internal e¢ ciency of primary school system as measured by the dropout rate seems
to have improved over the ve year period. These statistics thus point to two milestones
that Malawi has achieved; increased primary enrolment, and improved internal e¢ ciency.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 A Stochastic Production Frontier with Non-Monotonicity
This paper uses a stochastic production frontier to measure technical e¢ ciency. I adopt a
stochastic frontier model developed by Wang (2002). The advantage of the Wang (2002)
model is that it nests two modeling approaches as special cases. The rst approach focuses
on factors a¤ecting the mean of technical ine¢ ciency (see for example Kumbhakar et al.
(1991), Huang & Liu (1994), and Battese & Coelli (1995)). The other approach deals
with factors that inuence production uncertainty i.e. the variance of the ine¢ ciency
e¤ect (see for example Caudill et al. (1995), and Hadri (1999)). Using the Wang (2002)
model, this paper is therefore able to investigate the presence of externality e¤ects of
schooling on both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty.
The production structure for maize eld i belonging to household j which is in
community l is specied using a single-output, multi-input Cobb-Douglas production
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frontier given as follows
ln qijl = ln q

ijl   uijl
= 0 +
5X
k=1
k lnxijlk + E + vijl   uijl (1)
vijl  N
 
0; 2v

(2)
uijl  N+

ijl; 
2
uijl

(3)
ijl = wsijl + zijl (4)
2uijl = exp (wsijl + zijl) (5)
where; qijl is rainfed maize output, qijl is unobserved frontier/potential output, 0
is an intercept, k (l = 1::5) are output elasticities with respect to inputs xijl. There are
ve inputs; land measured in acres, own and hired labour measured in man days, capital
measured as the total monetary value in Malawi Kwacha of farm implements (hoes, slash-
ers, axes, oxcarts, oxploughs) owned by a household, seed measured in kilograms, organic
and inorganic fertilizer measured in kilograms. E is a vector of agro-ecological zone dum-
mies which capture zone level xed e¤ects, and  is the corresponding coe¢ cient vector.
There are eight rural agro-ecological zones. Agro-ecological zones control for di¤erences
in climate, soils, and market access conditions in an area1. Sherlund et al. (2002) show
that failure to control for environmental conditions may lead to omitted variable bias in
the estimated parameters of the production frontier, and biased estimated coe¢ cients in
the technical ine¢ ciency model. vijl is a two sided random variable representing random
variations in the economic environment facing production units, reecting luck, weather,
measurement errors, and omitted variables from the model. uijl = ln qijl   ln qijl > 0
is a technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect which is a non-negative truncation of a normal random
variable. It represents deviations from potential output that reect ine¢ ciency such as
farm-specic knowledge, the will and skills of farmers, and other disruptions to produc-
tion. The notation "+" means that the underlying distribution is truncated from below
at zero so that realized values of the random variable uijl are positive. It is assumed that
vijl and uijl are independent of each other.
Of interest in this paper is the technical ine¢ ciency model (equation (4)) and the
production uncertainty model (equation(5)). The ine¢ ciency model captures how the
average years of schooling in a household sjl, and other exogenous farm-specic control
variables, zijl; inuence ine¢ ciency. Similarly, the production uncertainty model repre-
sents the relationship between production uncertainty- as measured by the variance of the
ine¢ ciency e¤ects- and the average years of schooling in a household and other control
variables. In both models, average years of schooling in a household capture the intra-
1Alternatively, community level xed e¤ects can be used here, however, since there are 624 communities
after data cleaning, this means estimating too many xed e¤ects, and a loss of degrees of freedom.
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household externality of education. The empirical analysis also uses the maximum years
of schooling in a household as a robustness check. The production uncertainty model
presents a more technical advantage over a model which assumes that the ine¢ ciencies
are homoscedastic. Explicitly modeling the exogenous factors ensures that the estimation
of the production frontier model and the level of technical ine¢ ciency is not biased, hence,
policy conclusions are premised on valid results (e.g. Caudill et al. 1995; Hadri,1999).
w and w are coe¢ cients of schooling on e¢ ciency and production uncertainty, and 
and  are the corresponding coe¢ cient vectors of the control variables. The ine¢ ciency
and production uncertainty models and the stochastic frontier production function in
equation (1) are estimated jointly using maximum likelihood estimation to achieve both
e¢ ciency and consistency. Farm-specic estimates of technical e¢ ciency are obtained via
the conditional expectation E[exp(uijljvijl)] (Battese & Coelli, 1988).
In order to capture the interhousehold externality e¤ect of schooling on e¢ ciency and
uncertainty, I decompose the average years of schooling in a household sjl into a between-
community component, ~sl; and a within-community component, sjl  ~sl, and then modify
equations (4) and (5) to get
ijl = w (sjl   ~sl) + b~sl + zijl (6)
= wsjl + (b   w) ~sl + zijl
and
2uijl = exp(w (sjl   ~sl) + b~sl + zijl) (7)
= exp (wsij + (b   w) ~sl + zijl)
where b and b represent the between-community e¤ect, and the di¤erence  = b   w
and  = b   w, represents the externality e¤ect i.e. the additional e¤ect of schooling at
the community level that is not accounted for at the household level. As a robustness
check, I also use the maximum years of schooling in a community.
I use marginal e¤ects to test for the presence of externality e¤ects of schooling on
ine¢ ciency and uncertainty. The marginal e¤ect of ~sl on the conditional expectation of
uijl is given as (Wang, 2002; Liu & Myers, 2009)
@E (uijj lnxij; sij; ~sj; zij)
@~sl
= 
 
1  A1A2   A22

+
u
2

(1 + A1)A2 + A1A
2
2

(8)
where A1 =
uij
uij
and A2 =
(A1)
(A1)
.  and  are the probability and cumulative density func-
tions of a standard normal distribution respectively. Thus, a test of the hypothesis that
@E(uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
= 0; amounts to testing that there are no externality e¤ects of school-
ing at the community level on e¢ ciency. The sign and magnitude of
@E(uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
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respectively indicate the direction and size of the externality e¤ect. A positive (negative)
externality e¤ect of community level schooling on e¢ ciency holds if
@E(uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
<
0

@E(uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
> 0

: Since
@E( uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
=
@E(ln qij j lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zijl)
@~sl
; the mar-
ginal e¤ect is also the semi-elasticity of output with respect to ~sl:
Similarly, the marginal e¤ect of ~sl on the conditional variance of the ine¢ ciency term
uijl is expressed as (Wang, 2002; Liu & Myers, 2009)
@V (uijlj lnxijl; sjl; ~sl; zij)
@~sl
=

2u
A2
 
m21  m2

(9)
+2u

1  1
2
A2

A1 + A
3
1 +
 
2 + 3A21

A2 + 2A1A
2
2

where m1 = u (A1A2 + A2) and m2 = 2u (1  A1A2   A22) is the mean and variance
of uij respectively. To test whether or not community level schooling a¤ects produc-
tion uncertainty involves testing the hypothesis that
@V (uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sl
= 0. A posi-
tive (negative) externality e¤ect of community level schooling on production uncertainty
holds if
@V (uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sl
> 0

@V (uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sl
< 0

: Since
@V (uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sl
=
@V (ln qij j lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sl
; the marginal e¤ect is also the semi-elasticity of the output variance
with respect to ~sl:The marginal e¤ects for the intrahousehold externality of education,
@E(uij j lnxij ;sij ;~sj ;zij)
@~sjl
and
@V (uijlj lnxijl;sjl;~sl;zij)
@~sjl
are analogously derived.
To assess how the community education externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency and produc-
tion uncertainty varies with household average years of schooling, I use equations (8)
and (9) to calculate marginal e¤ects of community level education for di¤erent quartiles
of household average years of schooling. Similarly, the heterogenous e¤ect of community
and household level schooling on di¤erent levels of e¢ ciency is captured by calculating
the corresponding marginal e¤ects for di¤erent quartiles of estimated e¢ ciency. As has
been shown by Wang (2002), equations (8) and (9) accommodate non-monotonic e¤ects
of ~sl; implying that the marginal e¤ects can be both positive and negative in the sample,
and their signs do not necessarily coincide with the signs of either of the slope coe¢ -
cients  and . The ability to capture non-monotonicity enables this paper to investigate
whether the household and community level schooling externalities switch signs across the
distributions of household and community level schooling. It thus, for example, allows
the demonstration of directional di¤erences in the externality e¤ects between households
and communities with low or no schooling and those with high levels of schooling.
3.2 Model specication tests
To ensure that the modeling structure as represented by equations (1) to (5) is valid, the
paper tests a number of hypotheses sequentially using the Wald test (hypotheses 1,2, 4,
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and 5), and a third-moment test developed by Coelli (1995) (hypothesis 3). The third
moment test is a skewness test, and seeks to determine if ordinary least squares residuals
are signicantly negatively skewed by using the standard normal distribution.
1. H0 : 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 =  = 0; this null hypothesis means that all variables
included in the frontier production function are jointly insignicant.
2. H0 :  = 0, the null hypothesis species that there are no agro-ecological zone xed
e¤ects.
3. H0 :  = 0 = 2u = 0; the null hypothesis implies that there is no ine¢ ciency
component. If the null hypothesis is true, then the truncated-normal model reduces
to a linear regression model with normally distributed errors.
4. H0 : w =  =  = 0, the null hypothesis species that the included exogenous
determinants of technical ine¢ ciency are jointly insignicant. A rejection of this
null implies that the the included exogenous factors together inuence technical
ine¢ ciencies.
5. H0 : w =  =  = 0, the null hypothesis species that the technical ine¢ ciency
e¤ects are homoscedastic. Failure to reject this null implies that the variance of tech-
nical ine¢ ciencies cannot be parameterized to capture determinants of production
uncertainty.
3.3 Data and descriptives
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3). It is
statistically designed to be representative at national, district, urban and rural levels. The
survey was conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2010 to March 2011.
The survey collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233 (representing
18.2%) are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural households. A
total of 768 communities (clusters) were selected across the country. In each district,
a minimum of 24 communities were interviewed while in each community a total of 16
households were interviewed. The survey collected socio-economic data at the household
level and on individuals within the households. It also collected data on farming activ-
ities including crop output, land, labour and other inputs. This paper focuses on rural
households as they are more involved in maize production. After data cleaning, I end up
with non-missing maize production data for 4863 elds belonging to 3765 households in
624 rural communities. Since all elds are nested in households and communities, this
feature of the data enables the paper to examine the internal (within the household) and
external (outside the household) e¤ect of schooling on maize production e¢ ciency and
uncertainty.
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Some of the maize elds are mixed stand elds with more than one crop planted in a
season. Since most inputs (land, fertilizer and labor) are at the eld level, and cannot be
uniquely assigned to maize production only, I follow Liu & Myers (2009), and generate a
maize output index. The dependent variable, maize yield, is therefore measured as follows
qijl =
( P
m pmqijlm
p1
if intercropped eld
qijl1 if monocropped eld
(10)
where qijl is the maize output index, pm is the market price of crop m, qijlm is the
yield of crop m in eld i for household j in community l, and crop 1 is maize. Thus, for
monocropped elds, maize yield is simply the actual yield. In addition to the independent
variables already discussed, the following variables are used included. I control for the age
of the principal farmer measured in years. A principal farmer is dened as a household
member who makes decisions concerning crops to be planted, input use and the timing of
cropping activities on a eld. Age proxies for experiences which are helpful in improving
production e¢ ciency. According to Coelli & Battese (1996) older farmers are likely to
have more farming experience and hence be less technically ine¢ cient. I capture gender
e¤ects by including a dummy variable for sex of the principal farmer dened as one for
male and zero for female. Female farmers tend to have a lower e¢ ciency level and higher
uncertainty of e¢ ciency (Liu & Myers, 2009). One possible explanation for this is that
female farmers do not have the same inheritance rights as males, and this reduces the
incentive to work hard.
Secure land tenure may lead to more investment such as soil conservation and tree
planting (see for example Deininger & Jin (2006)), and this may increase farm produc-
tivity. I capture security of land tenure by including a dummy variable which is one if
the land for maize is owned by a household and zero if not. A land is considered owned
if it was inherited or was purchased with a title deed. Binar et al. (2007) notes that
agricultural extension services may speed up the di¤usion process and the adoption of
new varieties and technologies as well as leading to the e¢ cient utilization of existing
technologies by improving farmersknow-how. I therefore control for the e¤ect of exten-
sion services by including a dummy variable which is equal to one if the household was
visited by an extension agent during the growing season, and zero if not.
Table 2 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the study. Land holdings
are small with the average log of land of -0.091. Levels of schooling are also low; the
average years of schooling is about 3.8 years within households, and 3.6 years at the
community level. These years of schooling correspond to junior primary education. The
averages of maximum years of schooling are 7.5 and 8.1 years at the household and
community levels respectively. These years of schooling are equivalent to senior primary
education in Malawi. The table also shows that 76% of the principal farmers are male,
and the average age of the principal farmer is about 43 years. Land tenure security is
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high, with 77% of the households saying they own the land they use for growing maize.
The penetration of extension services is low; only 29% of the households said they were
visited by an extension agent during the cropping season.
4 Results
4.1 Model specication results
In order to examine the validity of the modeling assumptions made in this paper, a number
of model specication tests are conducted, and the results are reported in Table 3. The
Wald test results show that all the variables included in the Cobb-Douglas production
frontier are jointly statistically signicant, and that there are statistically signicant agro-
ecological zone xed e¤ects. The third-moment test results lead to the rejection of the
null hypothesis of no ine¢ ciency component, and this means that technical ine¢ ciency
e¤ects are present. Given the presence of the technical ine¢ ciency e¤ect, the mean of
the ine¢ ciency term can be modeled as a linear function of a set of covariates. The
Wald test results indicate that the determinants of ine¢ ciency included in the technical
ine¢ ciency model are jointly signicant. Finally, Wald test results show that the technical
ine¢ ciency e¤ects are heteroscedastic; and this implies that the estimation of a production
uncertainty model is justied. I now turn to a discussion of the results for the production
frontier, technical ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty models.
4.2 Econometric results
The Cobb-Douglas production frontier results are reported in Table 4. They indicate
that the Cobb-Douglas production frontier is well-behaved and satises all regularity
conditions. Specically, monotonicity conditions are satised since marginal products are
all positive. Additionally, all the ve inputs have statistically signicant e¤ects on output.
Maize seeds as an input have the smallest e¤ect on maize output; fertilizer on the other
hand has the largest e¤ect on maize output. The output elasticity of fertilizer implies that
a 1% increase in fertilizer increases maize production by 0.42%. As mentioned earlier, the
government of Malawi has been implementing a farm input subsidy programme (FISP)
since the 2005/6 growing season. FISP provides provide low-cost fertilizer and improved
maize seeds to poor smallholders. The frontier results o¤er some interesting insights on
how the FISP can be altered to increase maize productivity. The combined e¤ect on
maize output of a 1% increase in seed and fertilizer is 0.47% while the combined e¤ect
on maize output of a 1% increase in land and fertilizer is 0.76%. This means that
a land redestribution exercise which is implemented together with a fertilizer subsidy
would have a 1.6 times larger e¤ect on maize production that the current practice under
FISP. The sum of the coe¢ cients of all the inputs, a measure of returns to scale is 1.14,
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suggesting that maize production in rural Malawi exhibits increasing returns to scale. A
Wald test (21 = 24:94) conrms that indeed there are increasing returns to scale in maize
production. This result is however not in conformity with ndings by Weir & Knight
(2007) and Asadullah & Rahman (2009) who found evidence of decreasing returns to
scale in cereal production by Ethiopian and Bangladesh farmers, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Battese and Coelli e¢ ciency estimates for the
sample. The e¢ ciency scores are skewed to the left implying that few maize farmers are
ine¢ cient. Average technical e¢ ciency is estimated to be at 0.66. The average technical
e¢ ciency of 0.66 means that maize production in rural Malawi can be increased by 34%
by simply improving technical e¢ ciency alone without increasing input usage. The most
e¢ cient maize eld has a technical e¢ ciency of 0.90 while the least e¢ cient has a tech-
nical e¢ ciency of 0.00. I now turn to the interpretation of the e¢ ciency and production
uncertainty results. Table 5 shows marginal e¤ects for the ine¢ ciency (i.e marginal ef-
fects on E (uijj lnxij; sij; ~sj; zij) and production uncertainty models (i.e marginal e¤ects
on V (uijlj lnxijl; sjl; ~sl; zij). For the technical ine¢ ciency model, positive marginal e¤ects
indicate relative technical ine¢ ciency while negative marginal e¤ects suggest relative tech-
nical e¢ ciency. For the production uncertainty results, positive marginal e¤ects imply
an increase in uncertainty while the reverse holds when the marginal e¤ects are negative.
The magnitude of the marginal e¤ects indicate the strength of this ine¢ ciency and pro-
duction uncertainty. All the ve control variables are statistically signicant in the two
models. The results are generally in conformity with a priori expectations and previous
literature. Interestingly, the marginal e¤ects on ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty
seem to be qualitatively similar.
An interesting pattern for all the variables which is consistent with Bera & Sharma
(1999), and Wang (2002) is that when a farmer moves toward the production frontier by
having higher e¢ ciency, it also reduces production uncertainty at the same time. Relative
to female farmers, the results indicate that male farmers are more e¢ cient, and they have
lower production uncertainty. This result is similar to and consistent with the ndings of
Liu & Myers (2009). The results suggest that other things being equal, an older farmer
is likely to achieve higher and more stable maize output. Since the marginal e¤ects are
also the semi-elasticities of output and output variance; holding other things constant,
an increase in a farmers age on average leads to a 0.01% increase in maize output, and
a 0.02% increase in the stability of maize production. These e¤ects though statistically
signicant, are clearly economically insignicant. The negative relationship between age
and e¢ ciency conforms to an assertion by Coelli & Battese (1996) that older farmers
are likely to be more e¢ cient because they have more farming experience. In contrast to
the nding of this paper, Wang (2002) nds that older farmers have less stable output.
Secure land is benecial as it leads to higher e¢ ciency and more stable maize production.
These ndings could possibly be due to the fact that secure land tenure may lead to more
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investment in soil conservation and tree planting which may lead to high and more stable
production. Consistent with Binar et al. (2007), the paper also nds that extension
services lead to higher e¢ ciency. Additionally, farmers who were visited by extension
agents have more stable maize output.
I now turn to the main focus of this paper, and discuss results on the existence, nature
and form of intrahousehold and interhousehold externalities of education. The results
in Table 5 show that there are statistically signicant and positive intrahousehold and
interhousehold externalities of education on both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty
of maize production in rural Malawi. In addition, the results also show that education
externalities are quantitatively large. The results indicate that the positive spillover e¤ect
of schooling within a household on both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty is larger
than the positive externality e¤ect of schooling at the community level. Since the marginal
e¤ects are also semi-elasticities of output; ceteris paribus, an additional year of schooling
within a household translates into an increase in output of 2.9%, and one more year of
schooling at the community level leads to an increase in output of 1.8%. The di¤erence
in the two externality e¤ects on e¢ ciency is statistically signicant with a t-statistic (p-
value) of 39.6 (0.00). In terms of production uncertainty, holding other things constant,
a unit increase in average schooling within a household leads to a 3.4% increase in the
output variance, and a unit increase in community level average schooling leads to an
increase in the output variance of 1.9%. This di¤erence is also statistically signicant
with a t-statistic (p-value) of 26.8 (0.00).
How robust is the evidence of the existence of intrahousehold and interhousehold
externalities of education to the way schooling is captured? The above results are based
on the average years of schooling within and between households. It can be argued that
the externality of schooling can best be captured by the highest level of education among
all household or all community members. The one who receives the highest education in
the household or at the community can help other household and community members
in making production decisions. I therefore re-estimated the above models, and replaced
household average years of schooling with the maximum years of schooling in a household,
and average years of schooling in a community with the maximum of years of schooling in a
community. The results are qualitatively similar to the ones seen before. Specically, I nd
statistically and economically signicant intrahousehold and interhousehold externalities
of education. The marginal e¤ects (standard errors) of maximum years of schooling in
a household on ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty are -0.0127 (0.0003) and -0.0145
(0.0004) respectively. Further to this, the marginal e¤ects (standard errors) of maximum
years of schooling in a community on ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty are -0.0102
(0.0003) and -0.0107 (0.0005) respectively2. Thus, the pattern observed earlier that the
intrahousehold externality e¤ects are larger than the interhousehold externality e¤ects
2A complete set of results is available from the author upon request.
13
remains unchanged even when this new denition is adopted. All this implies that the
nding that there are positive education spillovers is not sensitive to how schooling is
measured. The rest of the analysis is therefore based on average years of schooling at the
household and community levels.
Do farmers who reside in households where there is little or no education benet more
from living in communities where some inhabitants are educated? I answer this question
by looking at how the interhousehold externality e¤ect varies across di¤erent quartiles
of household level schooling. It is possible to estimate quartile-specic marginal e¤ects
because the marginal e¤ects are observation-specic. The results are reported in Table 6.
On e¢ ciency, the results indicate that the externality e¤ect of community level schooling
is highest for households where members have no or little education while it is smallest for
households with highly educated members. Specically, the interhousehold externality ef-
fect in the rst household schooling-quartile (i.e. the least educated households) is -0.0197.
This e¤ect translates into an increase in maize output of 2%. On the other hand, for
households in the last household schooling-quartile, the interhousehold externality e¤ect
is 0.0164; implying that maize output increases by 1.6%. The interhousehold externality
e¤ects for all the quartiles are both statistically and economically signicant. Turning to
production uncertainty, a similar pattern is observed. The marginal e¤ects of community
level schooling are -0.0253 and -0.0152 for the rst and last quartiles of household school-
ing respectively. This means that, ceteris paribus, the maize output variance decreases by
2.5% and 1.5% for farmers in the least educated and most educated households respec-
tively. These results suggest that in terms of both e¢ ciency and production stability of
maize production, community level schooling substitutes for household level schooling in
the sense that farmers who reside in households where members are not educated benet
more from living in communities where some inhabitants are educated.
Do less e¢ cient farmers benet more from household and community level school-
ing? Similar to the preceding analysis, I estimate the intrahousehold and interhousehold
education externalities for di¤erent quartiles of estimated e¢ ciency. The results of this
analysis are reported in Table 7. All the marginal e¤ects for the di¤erent quartiles are
both statistically signicant and quantitatively large. There is a decreasing trend of both
the intrahousehold and interhousehold education externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency and pro-
duction uncertainty from low to high quartiles of e¢ ciency. Looking at the relationship
between average household schooling and e¢ ciency, the marginal e¤ects are -0.0367 and
-0.0245 for the rst quartile and last quartiles respectively. This implies that an additional
year of education at the household level leads to an increase in maize output of 3.8% and
2.5% for the least e¢ cient and most e¢ cient farmers respectively. The interhousehold
externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency in the rst quartile is -0.0184 and it is -0.0172 in the last
quartile; suggesting that holding other things constant, farmers in the rst and last quar-
tiles experience an increase in maize output of 1.7% and 1.8% on account of an additional
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year of schooling in the community. This means that maize farmers with lower e¢ ciency
levels benet more from increased education within and between households than the ones
with higher e¢ ciency levels. In keeping with a pattern observed earlier, the results also
show that the intrahousehold externality e¤ect on e¢ ciency and production uncertainty
is larger than the interhousehold externality across all quartiles.
The nal problem addressed in this paper concerns whether or not the education
externalities vary with level of schooling. Put di¤erently, do the education externalities
remain the same both in terms of sign and magnitude no matter the level of schooling?
Evidence of nonlinearities would suggest that the externalities have a turning point. I di-
vide the average years of schooling at the household and community levels into quartiles, I
then use box plots of the estimated marginal e¤ects of the average years of schooling across
the four quartiles. Figures 3 and 4 shows the box plots which capture the evolution of
intrahousehold and interhousehold externality e¤ects on e¢ ciency and production uncer-
tainty across the quartiles. The marginal e¤ects do not switch signs across the quartiles,
implying the intrahousehold and interhousehold education externalities are monotonic.
The results also show a negative but declining trend in the magnitudes of the externality
e¤ects as one moves from the rst quartile to the last quartile, which means that edu-
cation is most valuable with respect to reducing ine¢ ciency and production uncertainty
when schooling is relatively low, and the benet is smaller at the higher education level.
5 Conclusion and policy implications
The paper has looked at the existence, nature and form of intrahousehold and interhouse-
hold externalities of education on e¢ ciency and production uncertainty of maize in rural
Malawi. Data from the Third Integrated Household Survey are used. The results indi-
cate that there are statistically and economically signicant positive intrahousehold and
interhousehold externalities of education on both e¢ ciency and production uncertainty.
These e¤ects are insensitive to how schooling is captured; the results are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar whether the externalities are measured using average years of
schooling or maximum years of schooling. It has been found that the intrahousehold
externality e¤ects are larger than the interhousehold externality e¤ects. The paper has
found that community level schooling substitutes for household level schooling in the sense
that farmers who reside in households where members are not educated have relatively
higher e¢ ciency and lower production uncertainty on account of living in communities
where some inhabitants are educated. The intrahousehold and interhousehold external-
ity e¤ect of education is more pronounced for the least e¢ cient farmers. The education
externalities are found to be monotonic, and largest when schooling is relatively low.
Malawi like other developing countries is largely agrobased, with the majority of the
population, especially the rural population, nding their livelihood in agriculture. The
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proportion of the population in wage employment is low. For instance, NSO (2012b) nds
that only 13.4% of the labour force in Malawi in 2011 was in regular wage employment.
Hence, the returns to education in the labour market though important are not very
useful as a guide on public investment in education. In this context, returns to education
in agriculture would be relevant. Further to this, and as pointed out earlier, the MGDS
despite identifying strategies to increase maize productivity does not explicitly recognise
the role that education can play in increasing maize productivity. The results in this
paper underline the fact that education can play an important role in increasing maize
productivity as well as ensuring that production risk or uncertainty is reduced. Crucially,
the ndings imply that farmers who are uneducated are not necessarily worse-o¤ in maize
production as they benet from living in households or communities where some members
are educated. The existence of social benets arising from educating individual members
of a society emphasises the fact that evaluation of the costs and benets of investments in
education should take into account the social returns; failure to do so may underestimate
the benets of education and lead to its underprovision.
The nding that the education externalities on both e¢ ciency and production are
most pronounced when schooling is low, further suggests that to increase maize pro-
ductivity, investments in education should focus more on primary education. This is
consistent with a large literature on social and private rates of return to education in
developing countries which show that returns to primary education are high, relative to
a discount rate and to returns to higher levels of education. Besides, the implication of
the results to focus more on primary education o¤ers some justication for the provision
of free primary education in Malawi, and the magnitude of the intrahousehold and inter-
household externalities of education is a useful indicator of the productivity of this public
investment in education.
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Figure 1. Evolution of maize yield, area harvested and production 2000-2012
Source: Author’s computation using FAOSTAT database
Table 1. Trends and levels of some education statistics, 2004-2011
Indicator Malawi Rural Urban
2004 2011 2004 2011 2004 2011
Adult literacy 63.9 65.4 60.9 60.7 85.6 89.0
Net primary enrolment rate 80.0 85.8 79.3 84.6 86.8 92.7
Gross primary enrolment rate 112.9 120.0 112.0 119.2 122.4 125.1
Primary dropout rate 5.1 1.3 5.3 1.4 4.1 0.9
Source: NSO (2005, 2012b)
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD
log of  yield 6.396 1.205
log of seed 1.836 1.509
log of land -0.091 0.783
log of fertilizer 4.208 0.712
log of labour 3.402 0.510
log of capital 6.567 1.112
zone1: Nsanje, Chikwawa districts 0.004 0.062
zone2: Blantyre, Zomba, Thyolo, Mulanje, Chiradzulu, Phalombe districts 0.172 0.378
zone3: Mwanza, Balaka, Machinga, Mangochi districts 0.124 0.330
zone4: Dedza, Dowa, Ntchisi districts 0.159 0.366
zone5: Lilongwe, Mchinji, Kasungu districts 0.203 0.402
zone6: Ntcheu, Salima, Nkhotakota districts 0.130 0.337
zone7: Mzimba, Rumphi, Chitipa districts 0.157 0.364
zone8: Nkhatabay, Karonga districts 0.051 0.219
average years of schooling in a household 3.822 2.268
average years of schooling in a community 3.576 1.071
maximum years of schooling in a household 7.496 3.330
maximum years of schooling in a community 8.056 2.206
male principal farmer 0.757 0.429
age of principal farmer 43.019 15.989
household visited by extension agent 0.290 0.454
land owned by household 0.770 0.421
Observations 4860
Table 3. Model specication tests
No. Hypothesis Wald /Z
statistic
DF P-value Conclusion
1 H0 : K1 = K2 = K3 = K4 = K5 = ^ = 0 4203.10 12 0.00 Frontier variablesjointly significant
2 H0 : ^ = 0 1325.10 7 0.00 Significant agro zonefixed effects
3 H0 : W = 0 = au2 = 0 -14.99 a - 0.00 Inefficiency effectsare present
4 H0 : Jw = J = R = 0 21.38 6 0.00 Efficiency variablesjointly significant
5 H0 : Sw = S = L = 0 29.18 6 0.00 Heteroscedasticmodel is valid
a This is based on the standard normal statistic. DF is degrees of freedom.
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Table 4. Translog production function results
Variable Coefficient
log of seed 0.0501***
(0.0082)
log of land 0.3430***
(0.0210)
log of fertilizer 0.4206***
(0.0207)
log of labour 0.2439***
(0.0261)
log of capital 0.0830***
(0.0118)
Zone 2 0.4740**
(0.2051)
Zone 3 0.7110***
(0.2056)
Zone 4 1.7267***
(0.2048)
Zone 5 1.3871***
(0.2044)
Zone 6 1.1310***
(0.2055)
Zone 7 0.5612***
(0.2057)
Zone 8 0.5453***
(0.2102)
Returns to scale 1.14
Chi2 4203.10
Observations 4860
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Figure 2. Kernel density estimate of technical e¢ ciency estimates
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Table 5. Marginal e¤ects of ine¢ ciency
Variable Inefficiency Uncertainty
average years of schooling in a household -0.0292*** -0.0339***
(0.0004) (0.0007)
average years of schooling in a community -0.0177*** -0.0190***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
male principal farmer -0.0734*** -0.0837***
(0.0007) (0.0012)
age of principal farmer -0.0001* -0.0002***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
land owned by household -0.0891*** -0.1176***
(0.0031) (0.0052)
household visited by extension agent -0.0176*** -0.0183***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 4860 4860
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 6. Marginal e¤ects over quartiles of average household schooling
Variable Quartiles
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Inefficiency
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.0197*** -0.0183*** -0.0173*** -0.0164***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Uncertainty
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.0253*** -0.0203*** -0.0176*** -0.0152***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Observations 945 1128 1321 1466
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7. Marginal e¤ects over quartiles of Battese and Coelli e¢ ciency estimates
Variable Quartiles
0-25 25-50 50-75 75-100
Inefficiency
average years of schooling in a
household
-0.0367*** -0.0285*** -0.0270*** -0.0245***
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.0184*** -0.0178*** -0.0175*** -0.0172***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Uncertainty
average years of schooling in a
household
-0.0474*** -0.0324*** -0.0301*** -0.0259***
(0.0021) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0006)
average years of schooling in a
community
-0.0210*** -0.0191*** -0.0184*** -0.0176***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Observations 1215 1215 1215 1215
Bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Figure 3. Externality e¤ect over quartiles of household average years of schooling
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Figure 4. Externality e¤ect over quartiles of community average years of schooling
24
